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Local Government's Institutional Status 
The Constitution recognises and makes provision for three levels of government that 
derive their powers from the Constitution. The constitutional status of a municipality, 
as part of the third sphere of government, is thus materially different from what it was 
when Parliament was supreme. Under the parliamentary sovereignty, the institution 
of elected local government could have been terminated at any time by the central or 
provincial governments. 
 
The judgement, delivered by the Constitutional Court in Fedsure Life Assurance and 
Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others1 
forms the bedrock of any analysis of local government's powers. It was in this case 
that the Constitutional Court made an unequivocal statement as to the status of local 
government in the post-1994 constitutional framework. The Court made it clear that 
"local government is no longer a public body exercising delegated powers. Its council 
is a deliberative legislative assembly with legislative and executive powers recognised 
in the Constitution itself."2 
 
The Court had to consider whether or not council resolutions levying rates and levies 
constituted "administrative action" and were therefore subject to principles of 
administrative justice. In the arguments before the Constitutional Court, the relevant 
municipal councils contended that the resolutions constituted legislative rather than 
administrative action, and accordingly were not subject to administrative justice. The 
Court agreed and said that the enactment of legislation by an elected local council 
acting in accordance with the Constitution is a legislative and not an administrative 
act. It is not subject to challenge by "every person" affected by it on the grounds, 
pertaining to administrative justice. 
 
This judgement put two cardinal principles of the new local government dispensation 
beyond doubt: Firstly, the institution of local government as a sphere of government 
and the powers of municipalities are recognised and protected in the Constitution. 
Secondly, the exercise of municipal legislative power is no longer a delegated 
function, subject to judicial and administrative review, but a political process, 
influenced by the considerations and input of elected councillors, representing the 
will of the municipal residents. 
 
What, then, are those local government powers that the new dispensation so carefully 
protects? 
 
Sources of Power For Local Government 
Section 156(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that a municipality has executive 
authority in respect of, and has the right to administer the local government matters 
listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 to the Constitution and any 
                                            
1 1998(12) BCLR 1458 (CC). 
2At para 26; see also Klaaren 1999: 11; Steytler and De Visser 1999: 6-7. 
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other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation. The Constitution 
recognises the municipal council as the highest legislative and executive authority 
within a municipality that can make decisions on the exercise of these powers within 
the municipality.3 
 
Original powers 
Schedules 4B and 5B constitute the primary source of power for local government. 
Local government derives these powers from the Constitution itself; it has original 
powers, listed in Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B of the Constitution.4 The obvious 
significance of this lies in the fact that the 'core' functions of local government cannot 
be removed or amended by ordinary statutes or provincial acts. These functions 
cannot be changed but for an amendment to the Constitution itself. Moreover, the 
powers of national and provincial governments to legislate on Schedule 4B and 5B 
matters are limited.5  These two components are probably the most critical and 
fundamental features of local government's institutional integrity. 
 
Assigned powers 
The secondary source of power for local government is assignment in terms of section 
156(1)(b), which provides that a municipality has executive authority in respect of, 
and has the right to administer any other matter assigned to it by national or 
provincial legislation. Assignment can take the form of general assignments or 
assignments to individual municipalities.6 
 
This article deals with two issues: 
Firstly, it attempts to demarcate the boundaries of local government's original 
legislative powers on Schedule 4B and 5B matters by analysing the powers of other 
spheres to legislate on Schedule 4B and 5B matters. Secondly, it discusses the legal 
framework for the assignment of additional powers to local government. 
 
Legislative powers of other spheres on local government's 'original 
powers' 
A test to determine which law prevails 
As stated above, local government can legislate on Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B 
matters. However, the Constitution does not allocate the matters in Schedule 4B and 
                                            
3 Section 151(1) of the Constitution: "A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs 
of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution"; section 160(1) of the 
Constitution: "A Municipal Council...makes decisions concerning the exercise of all the powers and the performance of all the 
functions of the municipality". 
4 Section 156(1) of the Constitution: "A municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer 
...the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5." See Debates of the Constitutional Assembly 
29 March to 8 May 1996 p 256 (ANC MP Mr M Bhabha), 259 (ANC MP Ms M Verwoerd), 273 (FF MP Mr P J Groenewald) 
and 279 (DP MP Mr K M Andrew). 
5 Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) para 25. 
6 Sections 44(1)(a)(iii), 104(1)(c), 99 or 126 of the Constitution provide for individual assignments; this article does address the 
issues of delegation in terms of section 238 of the Constitution or agency agreements, which are often used to transfer functions to 
local government. 
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5B exclusively to local government. National and provincial government can also 
regulate on those matters. 7  In fact, they have the authority to ensure that 
municipalities perform these matters adequately.8 This means that interference by 
national and provincial government in Schedule 4B and 5B matters is not only 
constitutionally permitted but also mandated in terms of their oversight role. What 
happens if a municipality legislates on a Schedule 4B or 5B matter whilst there is 
national or provincial legislation on the same matter? How are conflicts resolved? 
Section 156(3) determines that a by-law that conflicts with national or provincial 
legislation is invalid but what is the extent to which other spheres of government can 
legislate on these matters? This part of the article explores the legislative powers of 
local government by proposing a test for determining which law prevails if there is 
municipal as well as other legislation on one topic. Does the municipal by law prevail 
or does the national or provincial act prevail? 
 
 It is submitted that this test comprises of four questions. 
 
1. Is there national or provincial legislation on the subject matter of the by-law? 
2. If yes, does the by-law conflict with that legislation? 
3. If there is conflict, is the national or provincial law valid? 
4. Does the national or provincial legislation impede or compromise the 
municipality's ability to perform its task? 
 
1 Is there national or provincial legislation on the subject matter of 
the by-law? 
If there is no national or provincial legislation on the matter, the municipality has a 
free hand in deciding on the content of the by-law. If there is national or provincial 
legislation, the enquiry proceeds to the second question. 
The question arises as to what happens when provincial or national legislation is 
enacted subsequent to the passing of the by-law. It is suggested that the inquiry then 
proceeds to the second question. 
 
2 If yes, does the by-law conflict with that legislation? 
If a by-law does not conflict with national or provincial legislation, the override does 
not need to enter the equation and the by-law is valid. The question as to whether or 
not a by-law is in conflict with other legislation is not always easy to answer. For 
example, if a national law prevents the use of irregular scales and a municipal by-law 
on markets regulates the manner in which goods are weighed - namely open and for 
the customer to see - is there conflict? The national law regulates on a different topic, 
namely uniformity and trustworthyness of scales while the by-law regulates the fair 
conduct of merchants on a municipal market. 
                                            
7 Executive Council of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development at para. 23. 
8 White Paper on local government p 30. 
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It is suggested that the question as to whether or not there is conflict should be 
answered from a point of view of implementation and enforcement. There is no 
conflict if it is possible to implement and enforce both regulations with regard to the 
same matrix of events without difficulty. If the enforcement of both regulations is 
problematic, an there is an inconsistency. 
 
3 If there is conflict, is the national or provincial law valid? 
The Constitution does not give blanket regulatory power on Schedule 4B and 5B 
matters to national and provincial government. National or provincial legislation on 
local government matters must be enacted within national or provincial 
government's legislative competency. Chapter 7 of the Constitution determines the 
legislative competency of national and provincial governments on local government 
matters. There is a difference with the concurrency of powers between provincial and 
national powers of Schedule 4A matters. Were local government powers to be held 
concurrently with national or provincial government, this test would not apply. In a 
scheme of concurrent powers, both spheres have the same legislative competency and 
the overrides determine which law prevails in case of conflict. This is not the case with 
local government powers. National and provincial governments are afforded certain 
legislative powers in relation to local government matters: their powers are 
constrained.9 Therefore, the question of overrides is preceded by the question of 
competence to legislate. This is the most complex part of the test. The article will 
examine: 
• national powers over Schedule 4B; 
• provincial powers over Schedule 4B; 
• national powers over Schedule 5B; and 
• provincial powers over Schedule 5B. 
 
National government's powers on Schedule 4B matters 
Currently, national government's lawmaking powers on Schedule 4B matter are the 
subject of an important case, to be heard by the Pretoria High Court. The City of Cape 
is challenging national legislation that makes municipal electricity distribution 
subject to a licence issued by the National Electricity Regulator (NER) and makes 
municipal electricity tariffs subject to NER approval. Essentially it is claiming that it 
has the constitutional power to set its own electricity tariffs and to supply and 
distribute electricity in its area without needing a licence. Its Schedule 4B function of 
"electricity reticulation" entitles it to make and carry out decisions regarding 
electricity reticulation in its area and to exercise any power reasonably necessary for, 
or incidental to, the effective performance of its functions. This would include the 
right to set its own tariffs. 
 
National government has two sources of legislative competence in respect of Schedule 
4B matters: section 155(7) and section 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution. 
                                            
9 Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) para 25. 
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National laws in terms of section 155(7) 
National government can legislate on Schedule 4B matters on the basis of section 
155(7), which affords national government the power to 'regulate' the exercise by 
municipalities of their executive authority. This legislative power is limited, since it is 
circumscribed by the context of seeing to the "effective performance by municipalities 
of their functions in terms of Schedule 4" and the term "regulating". The term 
'regulating' in the context of section 155(7) was held by the Constitutional Court to 
connote "a broad managing or controlling rather than direct authorisation 
function".10 Textually, the word 'regulate' is used in the context of the exercise of a 
legislative and executive power of both national and provincial governments in 
respect of municipal executive authority. It is submitted that the powers in terms of 
section 155(7) do not extend to the 'core' of Schedule 4B matter, but rather deal with 
the framework within which local government is to exercise these powers.11 In other 
words, the regulatory power enables national government (and also provincial 
government, see below) to set essential national standards, minimum requirements, 
monitoring procedures etc. 
 
National laws in terms of section 44(1) 
National government can also legislate on Schedule 4B matters on the basis of section 
44(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution.12 There is no limitation contained in this provision. 
Does this amount to a broad legislative power, encompassing every aspect of the 
Schedule's matters? The introduction to Schedule 4B stipulates that the schedule 
contains local government matters that are of national and provincial competency "to 
the extent set out in section 155(6)(a) and (7)". The question, therefore, is whether 
this qualification also applies to Parliament's legislative power in terms of section 
44(1). Does section 155(7) qualify section 44(1)? In other words, can Parliament use 
its legislative power on 4B matters in terms of section 44(1) only to "see to the 
effective performance by municipalities" of those functions by "regulating the 
exercise ...of their executive authority or is section 44(1) limited only by the general 
principles of 151(4) and 41(g)?13 
 
A positive answer would prohibit Parliament from legislating on the 'core' of 4B 
matters, such as air pollution, municipal health services, municipal planning and 
water services. Parliament would have to limit its legislative efforts on those and 
                                            
10 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para. 377. 
11 Mettler 1998: 9. 
12 " 44. (1)The national legislative authority as vested in Parliament - 
(a) confers on the National Assembly the power 
- (i)  .............. 
(ii) to pass legislation with regard to any matter, including a matter within a functional 
area listed in Schedule 4, but excluding, subject to subsection (2), a matter within a 
functional area listed in Schedule 5; ..." 
13 Section 41(1) (g): "All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must (...) exercise their powers and 
perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere;" 
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other 4B matters to framework legislation, national standards, minimum 
requirements, monitoring procedures etc. 
 
Mettler argues that section 155(7) does not qualify section 44(1).14 A first reading of 
the relevant provisions appears to affirm his view. Yes, Schedule 4B circumscribes the 
competence of national government to section 155(7) but section 155(7) again makes 
its application "subject to section 44". More importantly, section 44 forms the 
bedrock of national lawmaking and the power of Parliament to legislate on 4B directly 
follows its power to amend the Constitution itself. To argue that section 155(7) 
qualifies section 44(1) would then not be in keeping with the key position of section 
44 in the Constitution. This would mean that Parliament can validly enact any kind of 
legislation on Schedule 4B matters and that the test envisaged in section 151(4) is the 
only test to be applied.15 If this submission were to be upheld, it would effectively 
remove the third question from the test outlined above in the case of national 
government's powers on Schedule 4B matters. 
 
This issue was dealt with, at least partly, by the Constitutional Court in Executive 
Council of the Province of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development et al.16 The national government's submission was that 
Parliament has concurrent powers with the other spheres of government in respect of 
all powers vested in such spheres by Chapter 7, except for matters falling within 
Schedule 5B. This submission was based on section 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution. In 
that same case, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces contended that the 
Constitution places certain constraints on Parliament's powers in respect of local 
government. The Constitutional Court agreed with the provinces. 
 
"The legislative power vested in Parliament by section 44(1)(a)(ii) "to pass 
legislation with regard to any matter... excluding, subject to subsection (2), a 
matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 5" must be exercised, in terms of 
subsection (4), "in accordance with, and within the limits of, the Constitution". 
Thus, where on a proper construction of the Constitution such limits exist, they 
constrain the residual power of Parliament... The submission that Parliament has 
concurrent powers with the other spheres of government in respect of all powers 
vested in such spheres by Chapter 7 is inconsistent with the language of the 
provisions of Chapter 7 itself and cannot be reconciled with the terms of section 
164. If Parliament indeed had full residual power in respect of all matters referred 
to in Chapter 7, there would have been no need for the reference in section 164 to 
"any matter not dealt with in the Constitution".17 
 
                                            
14 Mettler 1998: 7. 
15 See below. 
16 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 (CC). 
17 At para 25 and 28. 
 8 
 
In this case, the Court was dealing with issues related to legislation on the framework 
for local government, such as the establishment of municipalities and their internal 
arrangements. Therefore, it is not immediately clear from this, whether or not section 
155(7) qualifies section 44(1)(a)(ii). However, the Constitutional Court appears to 
confirm this view, albeit in passing, in Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v 
President of the RSA and others. The Court remarked that 
 
"Local governments have legislative and executive authority in respect of certain 
matters but national and provincial legislatures both have competences (...) for 
overseeing its functioning"18 
 
Two details are important: firstly, the Court defines the national competence as 
overseeing, and secondly, the footnote refers to section 155(7) of the Constitution. 
This implies that the Court views national government's role on Schedule 4B matters 
as a regulatory, rather than determinative role and that the source for this limitation 
is section 155(7). 
 
This issue appears to have been settled in the Langeberg case where the 
Constitutional Court summarised national legislative authority as follows: 
 
"...national legislative authority includes the power to make laws for the country 
concerning all matters except the functional areas described in Part 2 of Schedule 
4 and Part 2 of Schedule 5. In these areas, Parliament as limited legislative 
authority.19 
 
In addition to the above it is suggested that the principle of developmental local 
government should inform an interpretation that recognises the need for sufficient 
municipal discretion in regulating these matters whilst maintaining the need for 
national oversight and regulation. Therefore, the answer to the question whether or 
not section 155(7) qualifies section 44(1)(a)(ii) must be that it does. This means that 
national government's legislative power on Schedule 4B matters does not extend to 
the 'core' of Schedule 4B matters but is limited to the setting of a legal framework, 
including minimum standards and monitoring requirements. 
 
Provincial government's powers on Schedule 4B matters 
The sources of provincial power to legislate in Schedule 4B matters can be found in 
section 155(6)(a) and section 155(7). 
 
Provincial laws in terms of section 155(7) 
Provincial government has a regulatory power in terms of section 155(7). The same 
considerations that apply to national government's powers under section 155(7) apply 
here. 
                                            
18 Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA and others 1999(4) BCLR 382 (CC) at para 51 (emphasis added). 
19 Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) para 25 (emphasis added). 
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Provincial laws in terms of section 155(6)(a) 
Section 155(6)(a) echoes the duty to support and strengthen LG imposed on national 
and provincial government in section 154(1) for provincial government in particular. 
It instructs provinces to monitor and support LG and promote the development of LG 
capacity. The duty on the province to monitor and support in terms of section 
155(6)(a) can entail legislative measures which are aimed at either establishing a 
monitoring framework or impacting on the manner in which local government 
administers such matters. The Constitutional Court held that the "legislative and 
executive powers to support local government (LG) are...not insubstantial. Such 
powers can be employed by provincial governments to strengthen existing LG 
structures, powers and functions and to prevent a decline or degeneration of such 
structures, powers and functions."20 The Court further held that this power is to be 
read in conjunction with the legislative and executive role granted provincial 
government in sections 155(6)(b) and 155(7). In terms thereof, the provinces must 
assert legislative and executive power to promote the development of LG capacity to 
perform its functions and manage its affairs and may assert such powers, by 
regulating municipal executive authority, to see to the effective performance by 
municipalities of their functions in respect of listed LG matters. Taken together these 
competences are considerable and facilitate a measure of provincial government 
control over the manner in which municipalities administer Schedule 4B matters. 
This control is not purely administrative. It could encompass control over municipal 
legislation to the extent that such legislation impacts on the manner of administration 
of LG matters. 
 
The word "monitor" in section 155(6) was not interpreted by the Court as bestowing 
additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on the domain of local 
government, beyond perhaps the power to measure or test at intervals its compliance 
with national and provincial legislative directives or with the Constitution itself.21 
Assessment 
This short discussion of the legislative powers of national and provincial powers with 
regard to Schedule 4B matters presents the following picture: 
• Local government has legislative authority over Schedule 4B matters. 
• Provincial government has regulatory powers over Schedule 4B matters - these 
cannot be prescriptive with regard to the 'core' of Schedule 4B matters but are 
limited to the setting of a legal framework, which includes minimum standards 
and monitoring. 
• National government has regulatory powers over Schedule 4B matters - these 
cannot be 
prescriptive with regard to the 'core' of Schedule 4B matters but are limited to the 
setting of a legal framework, which includes minimum standards and monitoring. 
                                            
20 In Re: Certification of the Constitutional of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (1) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 371. 
21 See also Pimstone 1998: 7. 
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National government's powers on Schedule 5B matters 
All Schedule 5 matters are matters of 'exclusive provincial legislative competence'. 
The exclusivity is however subject to section 44(2), which enables national 
government to legislate on Schedule 5 matters "when it is necessary - 
(a) to maintain national security; 
(b) to maintain economic unity; 
(c) to maintain essential national standards; 
(d) to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or 
(e) to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the 
interests of another province or to the country as a whole." 
The test centres around the 'necessity' requirement and intervention is limited to the 
listed grounds. If the section 44(2) test has been passed, the national legislation is 
valid and operative. 
 
It is submitted that the same qualification applies, namely that the legislative power 
does not extend to the 'core' of Schedule 4B matters but is limited to the setting of a 
legal framework, including minimum standards and monitoring requirements. 
 
Provincial government's powers on Schedule 5B matters 
The provincial government's legislative competence in respect of Schedule 5B is 
similar to its powers in respect of Schedule 4B matters. Consequently, provincial 
government has the same regulatory powers with regard to both 4B and 5B matters. 
On the face of it, it appears that these regulatory powers of provincial government 
with regard to 5B matters are wider than national government's regulatory powers, 
since provincial government is not restricted to the grounds listed in section 44(2) 
nor is it subject to the necessity requirement. 
 
Assessment 
 Local government has legislative and executive authority over Schedule 5B 
matters. 
 Provincial government has regulatory powers over Schedule 5B matters - these 
cannot be prescriptive with regard to the 'core' of Schedule 5B matters but are 
limited to the setting of a legal framework, which includes minimum standards 
and monitoring  
 National government has regulatory powers over Schedule 5B matters, 
restricted to the grounds of section 44(2) and the 'necessity requirement' in 
that provision. 
 
The diagram below illustrates the legislative powers of national and provincial 
governments on local government matters. 
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The above outline can assist in determining whether a provincial or national law on a 
Schedule 4B or Schedule 5B matter is valid. If, on the basis of these questions, the 
national or provincial law is deemed to be enacted within the relevant sphere's 
powers, the enquiry proceeds to the last question. 
 
4 Does the national or provincial legislation impede the municipality's 
ability to perform its task? 
Section 151(4) establishes a principle that underpins all relationships between local 
government and other spheres of government including those discussed above. It 
provides that "...national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a 
municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions".22 
 
Section 41(c)(g) of the Constitution, which is to be read in the context of Chapter 3 on 
cooperative government, contains a message that is very similar to section 151(4): "All 
spheres of government... must... exercise their powers and perform their functions in 
a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional 
integrity of government in another sphere." The Constitutional Court applied this 
                                            
22 Babha remarks that 151(4) "ensures that any obstructive behaviour on the part of provincial and national government will not 
be tolerated". See Bhabha 1997: 16. 
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section in the Public Service Amendment Act case.23 The Court emphasised that 
section 41(1)(g) is concerned with the way power is exercised, not with whether or 
not a power exists. It is suggested that the meaning of section 151(4) is similar. 
National or provincial legislation must still comply with section 151(4) of the 
Constitution, even it the competency existed to enact such legislation. The 
requirement of section 151(4) is different from the question as to whether or not the 
national or provincial government was competent. The competency argument deals 
with the question as to whether or not the national or provincial government in fact 
has the power to make laws on Schedule 4B or Schedule 5B matters. After it has been 
determined that national or provincial government has the power to make these laws, 
section 151(4) deals with the way in which the power is exercised. 
 
Breach of 151(4): invalid or inoperative? 
Section 151(4) must be located within the context of the 'override' principles of section 
156(3). Section 156(3) stipulates that a by-law that conflicts with national or 
provincial legislation is invalid, subject to the rule of 151(4). In other words, a by-law 
that is in conflict with national or provincial legislation that does not meet the test of 
section 151(4), is not invalid. Conversely, it is not quite clear as to what the status is of 
national or provincial legislation that impedes or compromises in terms of section 
151(4). 
 
The one argument is that 151(4) functions as an 'override' clause. If national or 
provincial government enacts legislation on a matter where it is competent to 
legislate and the legislation does not pass muster under 151(4), it becomes 
inoperative. The other argument is that legislation that compromises or impedes a 
municipality's ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions is simply invalid. 
The second argument is to be preferred. It is difficult to conceive of an inoperative 
national or provincial act that compromises or impedes in terms of 151(4), which can 
become operative again. The strong wording of 151(4) seems to connote a permanent 
defect to that legislation. Again, the interpretation by the Constitutional Court of 
section 41(c)(g) of the Constitution in the Public Service Amendment Act case is 
instructive here.24 The Court assessed the effect of the exercise of a power, in a 
manner that is contrary to this provision, as follows – 
 
"Although the circumstances in which section 41(1)(g) can be invoked to defeat the 
exercise of a lawful power are not entirely clear, the purpose of the section seems to 
be to prevent one sphere of government using its powers in ways which would 
undermine other spheres of government, and prevent them from functioning 
effectively. The functional and institutional integrity of the different spheres of 
government must, however, be determined with due regard to their place in the 
                                            
23 Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA and others 1999(4) BCLR 382 (CC). 
24Ibid at para 57. 
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constitutional order, their powers and functions under the Constitution, and the 
countervailing powers of other spheres of government."25 
 
The only logical conclusion is that if legislation falls foul of section 44(1)(g), it is 
invalid. It is submitted that likewise national or provincial legislation that constitutes 
an impediment in terms of section 151(4) will also be invalid. 
 
The Constitutional Court's approach in the Executive Council of the Western Cape 
case also affirms this view. In assessing national and provincial legislative 
competencies over local government matters, the Court remarked that –  
 
"[T]he powers of municipalities must...be respected by the national and provincial 
governments which may not use their powers to "compromise or impede a 
municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.. .The 
Constitution therefore protects the role of local government, and places certain 
constraints upon the powers of Parliament to interfere with local government 
decisions.if an Act of Parliament is inconsistent with such constraints it would to 
that extent be invalid."26 
 
For example, when a provincial act in terms of section 155(7) on a Schedule 4B matter 
amounts to more than 'regulation', it will simply be invalid because provincial 
government legislates outside of its competency. However, even when the act does 
not amount to more than 'regulation', but the way in which the power is exercised 
constitutes an impediment, it will also be invalid for it falls foul of section 151(4) of 
the Constitution. But also the exercise by national government of its general powers 
in terms section 44(1)(a)(ii) or 44(2) can be challenged if it impedes or compromises 
local government in terms of section 151(4) and can consequently be invalid. 
If the national or provincial act does not compromise or impede local government, 
the answer must be that, in terms of section 156(3), the by-law is invalid and the 
provincial or national act prevails. 
 
Assignment of Powers to Local Government 
The second part of the article deals with the secondary source of power for local 
government, namely assignment. When the new premier of the Western Cape took 
office in January 2002, he vowed to "devolve[e] as many provincial functions as 
possible onto local authorities which have the capacity to perform them".27 According 
to the Premier, poverty must be fought at local level. This is in line with the 
                                            
25 Ibid at para. 58. 
26 The Executive Council of the Province of the Western Cape v The Ministerfor Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development of the Republic 
of South Africa BCRL 1999 
27 'Highs and lows of Peter Marais' Business Day (18 January 2002). 
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commitment to building a strong local government sphere where delivery on the 
promise of development must take place. Assignment is the most important way of 
bringing functions down to local government. This part discusses the legal framework 
for assigning powers and responsibilities to local government. 
 
Why is assignment important? 
The functioning of municipalities is compromised if responsibilities are given to 
municipalities without resources. Internationally, one of the biggest problems that 
local authorities experience is the dreaded 'unfunded mandate'.28 It is also important 
that the responsibilities of national, provincial and local governments are clear: 
uncertainty over who does what leads to inadequate service delivery.29 Clarity over 
assignments, the procedures, their content and impact is therefore important. This 
article examines the legal framework for assignment of powers to local government. 
Section 156(1)(b) provides that a municipality has authority over any other matter 
assigned to it by national or provincial legislation. There are - 
• general assignments (ie. to local government in general); and 
• assignments to individual municipalities. 
 
There are two more sources of power, namely delegation in terms of section 238 of 
the Constitution and contractual agreements (agencies). However, the article does 
not deal with these. 
 
Assignment: The Legal Provisions 
The legal regime for assignment is regulated in the Constitution and in sections 9 and 
10 of the Municipal Systems Act.30 There are three categories of assignment. The 
distinction between the three categories is important because it determines the 
applicable legal framework. 
 
General assignment of legislative and executive powers 
Section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution, the general provision on assignment, is the 
basis for national or provincial legislatures to assign matters to local government by 
legislation. This means that a national Act of Parliament would assign a matter, that 
falls outside of Schedule 4B or Schedule 5B to the entire local government sphere. An 
example could be an Act that stipulates that 'low cost housing' (part of the 4A 
competency 'Housing') is assigned to local government. This would mean that 
municipalities are afforded the power to administer and regulate 'low cost housing' as 
a competency of their own. A provincial legislature can do the same and assign a 
matter to the local government sphere in the province. This would result in all 
                                            
28 Rondinelli D, Nellis J and Cheema G Decentralization in developing countries: a review of recent experience Worldbank research 
working paper 1983 at p 49. 
29 See also Grootboom and others v Oostenberg Municipality and others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 at para 40. 
30 Curiously, the Systems Act assumes that only provincial or national executives can initiate assignments. It is unclear what the 
application is of section 9 and 10 when the assignment of legislative power is initiated by a member of a provincial legislature or 
by the National Assembly in accordance with section 55(1) or 119 of the Constitution. 
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municipalities in that province having the power to administer and regulate that 
particular issue. The assignment of legislative power does not mean that there is an 
obligation on each municipality to adopt by-laws on the topic. However, the 
assignment does not have to be a blanket transfer: national or provincial government 
can circumscribe the legislative power in the assignment act. 
 
The Systems Act provides for a number of requirements to general assignments by 
legislation. Before introducing the Bill in Parliament, the relevant (Deputy) Minister 
must - 
1. publish the Bill for public comment; 
2. consult with the Minister for Provincial and Local government, the Minister of 
Finance and SALGA; and 
3. request an assessment of the financial implications from the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission.31 
 
Further, the (Deputy) Minister, initiating the assignment must assess: 
1. whether the assignment imposes a duty on the municipalities concerned; 
2. whether the duty falls outside Schedule 4B and 5B; and 
3. whether the performance of the duty has financial implications.32 
 
If the answer to these three question is positive, the (Deputy) Minister must 'take 
appropriate steps to ensure sufficient funding, and capacity building initiatives as 
may needed, for the performance of the assigned function or power by the 
municipalities concerned'.33 
 
The above also applies to the general assignment by a province to the municipalities 
in that province. The MEC who initiates the assignment must do the same, albeit that 
he or she must consult with the provincial MECs for local government and finance 
and with organised local government in the province.34 
 
Individual assignments of legislative power 
In terms of section 44(1)(a)(iii) and 104(1)(c) of the Constitution, national or 
provincial legislatures can assign legislative power to specific municipal councils.35 
This means that a national Act of Parliament would assign legislative power over a 
particular issue to an individual municipal council. For example the national 
government could assign the power to regulate 'Animal control' (a Schedule 4A 
                                            
31 S 9(1). 
32 S 9(3); In answering the question about the financial implications, the assessment of the Fiscal and Financial Commission 
must be considered. The question as to whether or not the duty falls outside 4B and 5B (s 9(3)(b)) seems irrelevant. Section 
154(1)(b) allows for any matter other than those listed in 4B and 5B to be assigned by legislation. Assignment would in any event be 
superfluous if the matter falls within 4B or 5B: in that event, local government has the original power. 
33 S 9(3). 
34 S 9(2),(3) and (4). 
35 For Parliament, this excludes the power to amend the Constitution. 
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matter) to a municipality. This would give that municipality to right to regulate those 
matters within its area of jurisdiction. 
 
Provincial legislatures could do the same. For example, the Western Cape Provincial 
legislature could assign the legislative power over 'Libraries' (a Schedule 5B matter) 
to a municipality. This would give that municipality the right to regulate libraries in 
its area of jurisdiction. Importantly, this refers to an assignment of a legislative 
power. A legislative power is discretionary. The municipality 'on the receiving end' of 
the assignment cannot be compelled to legislate. However, the scope of the 
municipality's legislative power can be circumscribed in the act. 
 
A national minister initiating the assignment must consult the Minister for Provincial 
and Local Government before introducing the Bill in Parliament.36 An MEC initiating 
the assignment must consult the MEC for local government in the province before 
introducing the Bill. The Minister or MEC, initiating the assignment must assess 
whether or not it imposes a duty, whether or not the duty falls outside Schedule 4B 
and 5B and whether there are financial implications. If the answer to those questions 
is positive, the Minister or MEC must take appropriate steps to ensure sufficient 
funding and capacity building initiatives.37 
 
Individual assignments of executive power 
Sections 99 and 126 of the Constitution allow national and provincial Ministers to 
assign executive powers to specific municipal councils. This mode of assignment 
differs from the previous assignments in a number of ways: 
1. It concerns executive powers only and no legislative powers. 
2. It entails a compulsion: the relevant sections speak of the assignment of a 
matter 'that is to be exercised'. Therefore, whereas the assignment of legislative 
power allocates discretionary powers, the assignment of executive power 
allocates a duty to do something. 
3. This is why it must be concluded by means of an agreement with the 
municipality. 
 
The national minister initiating the assignment by way of an agreement must consult 
the Minister for Provincial and Local Government before concluding the agreement.38 
If the assignment imposes a duty that falls outside of Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B 
and it has financial implications the minister must ensure funding and capacity 
building.39 
 
Similar conditions apply for provincial MECs initiating the assignment: there must be 
an agreement and the MEC initiating the assignment must consult the national 
                                            
36 S 10(1). 
37
 S 10(3). 
38
 S 10(1)(b). 
39 S 10(3). 
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Minister for Provincial and Local Government before concluding the agreement.40 At 
first sight, the requirement in section 10(2)(b) seems strange compared to the logic of 
sections 9 and 10: why would the MEC have to consult with the national Minister 
before assigning by agreement when he or she has to consult with the provincial MEC 
for local government before assigning by legislation. The rationale must lie in the 
absence of the checks and balances associated with the legislative process. This 
necessitates consultation with a 'higher' organ in the instance of assignment by 
agreement, which is an executive act. If the assignment imposes a duty, with financial 
implications, which falls outside of Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B the MEC must 
ensure funding and capacity building.41 
 
Why are the MEC and the Minister obliged to ensure funding and capacity building if 
the municipality must, in any event, agree to the assignment? One would expect that a 
municipality does not agree to the assignment of a duty, unless it is convinced that 
these measures have been taken. However, in light of the commitment to a strong 
developmental local government with municipalities that are mature partners of 
provincial and local government, the obligation appears necessary. A specific 
statutory obligation will strengthen municipalities in their negotiations with other 
spheres of government around the assignment of duties. 
 
Subsidiarity 
Section 156(4) of the Constitution adds an important dimension. It entrenches the 
principle of subsidiarity. This principle means that a government function should be 
performed as close to the people as possible. Section 156(4) makes assignment by 
agreement of the administration of a Schedule 4A or 5A matter to a municipality by 
national and provincial government compulsory if - 
• the matter would be most effectively administered locally; and 
• the municipality has the capacity to administer it. 
 
Does this mean that the municipality can make by-laws on matters that were assigned 
in terms of section 156(4)? The text and context of the provision suggests otherwise. 
The assignment must be effected by agreement. A legislative power cannot be 
transferred by agreement. 
 
Assessment: Preventing Unfunded Mandates 
The rationale behind the above procedures and requirements appears to be the 
'protection' of local government against the assignment of responsibilities without 
resources. It is early days to speculate on the effectiveness of this protection. The 
value of the provisions will depend on the stakeholders' commitment to effective local 
government. 
                                            
40 S 10(2). 
41 S 10(3). 
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Procedural and substantial requirements 
The requirements can be broken up in procedural and substantial requirements. The 
procedural requirements relate to the mandatory consultation with provincial and 
national finance ministers, ministers responsible for local government, organised 
local government or with the Financial and Fiscal Commission. In the case of the 
general assignments there is also the requirement of publication in terms of section 
154(2) of the Constitution. Procedural requirements are no absolute quarantee for 
adequate protection against unfunded mandates. The effectiveness of this protection 
will depend on, inter alia, - 
• the degree to which the organ of state that initiates the assignment takes 
serious the consultation and the arguments proffered by the agencies that are to 
be consulted. For example, how much time will be allowed for preparing input, 
at what stage of the preparation process are the various agencies involved, do 
they have real input or will they be faced with faites accompli? 
• the degree to which consulted agencies are able and willing to bring forward 
coherent and convincing arguments, protecting local government against 
unfunded mandates and the degree to which they in fact have that agenda. 
Organised local government will certainly have the protection against unfunded 
mandates high on its agenda. However its capacity to advocate local 
government's interest in assignment issues is still an uncertain variable. 
 
The substantial requirements relate to the 'appropriate steps' that the MEC or the 
Minister must take to ensure funding and capacity building. This appears to be a 
stronger and more direct protection against unfunded mandates. It is an 
implementation of the provisions in the Constitution that instruct provincial and local 
government to support the capacity of local government. The protection is phrased in 
a mandatory wording. The courts have already said that the duty to support is 
enforceable in court. 42  In the extreme case, when all other avenues have been 
exhausted, a municipality can challenge an assignment in court on the basis that 
'appropriate steps' were not taken. However, the requirement does not relate to 
'outcome' (namely the presence of sufficient funds or capacity) but to 'input' 
(appropriate steps to ensure sufficient funding and initiatives to build capacity). It is 
likely that a court would only test whether or not the measures taken to support the 
municipalities were 'reasonable'. 
 
However, the constitutional mandate of developmental local government and the 
pernicious effect that loading unfunded responsibilities on local government has on 
the implementation of this paradigm should inform the assessment of these 
requirements. 
 
                                            
42 MEC for Local Government, Mpumalanga v IMATU 2002 (1) SA 76 (SCA); see also Steytler 2002: 13. 
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Explicit assignment 
One of the critical problems that make this intricate scheme difficult to implement 
and monitor is the fact that assignments are currently not explicitly formulated as 
such. Legislation that is tabled in national or provincial Parliaments does not always 
state upfront that a function is being assigned. Whether or not powers or functions 
are in fact being assigned is thus a matter of legislative interpretation. This makes the 
division of responsibilities between spheres of government unpredictable and 
unclear. It also compromises the implementation of the safeguards against unfunded 
mandates. This can probably be explained by the lack of knowledge at departments 
other than those responsible for local government about the new local government 
dispensation. In addition, there is a lack of co-ordination between departments 
around matters affecting local government. National and provincial departments of 
local government have a crucial role to play in ensuring that these safeguards do not 
have a hollow ring to them. 
 
For example, when the Law Commission formulated proposals to review the Child 
Care Act,43 it proposed, amongst other things, to oblige local government in terms of a 
new children's statute to 
 
"keep a register of the total number of children and record their ages, in its area of 
jurisdiction."44 
 
The obligation on local government to keep this kind of register falls outside of its 
original power to regulate and administer 'child care facilities'.45 An assignment 
would be necessary. The Law Commission's proposal does not refer to or 
acknowledge the need for an assignment. Local government might be the most 
appropriate sphere of government to perform such a function. However, the 
imposition of such a duty on local government would have enormous administrative 
and financial implications. The mere formulation in national legislation of such a 
duty on local government is unconstitutional and not in keeping with the system of 
intergovernmental relations. Since it would concern an assignment of a specific duty 
and not the assignment of legislative power, it would have to be done in terms of 
section 99 or 126 of the Constitution. This means that it would have to be preceded by 
an obligation on the relevant ministry to perform that task. Subsequently, the 
Minister would have to assign in terms of sections 99 or 126 to specific 
municipalities, subject to agreement and the requirements of section 10 of the 
Systems Act. 
 
The application of these sections should not depend on a municipality challenging an 
assignment in court or elsewhere. Rather, it should be an integral element of the 
                                            
43 Act 74 of 1983; 
44 Law Commission, Review of the Child Care Act, Discussion Paper 103 (Project 110) at paragraph 9.7.4 available at 
www.law.wits.ac.za; see also Zaal and Matthias 2002: 149. 
45 Schedule 4B of the Constitution. 
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system of intergovernmental relations, which includes respect for institutional 
integrity and prior consultation over measures that stand to affect local government. 
 
Interface between subsidiarity and section 10 of the Systems Act 
If a particular matter must be assigned because the requirements of the subsidiarity 
principle of section 156(4) are met, what is then the role of section 10 of the Systems 
Act? Should that procedure still be followed? If, for example, one of the unicities 
successfully 'claims' the assignment of the administration of Libraries on the basis of 
section 156(4), should the relevant provincial minister still follow the procedure set 
out in section 10? Section 10 refers to an assignment 'initiated' by the provincial or 
national executive? Can it still apply to an assignment 'initiated' by a municipality? It 
could be argued that the two provisions exclude one another: section 156(4) applies 
when capacity to administer exists, therefore the requirements in section 10 around 
the assessment of financial implications, capacity building etc. do not come into play. 
 
It is suggested that the two should not be interpreted to be mutually exclusive but 
rather harmoniously and against the backdrop of the need for strong, developmental 
local governments. Section 156(4) is a general principle and not the outline of a 
procedure to assign. Section 156(4) should prompt a national or provincial executive 
to put the process of section 10 in motion rather than to replace it. 
 
Assessment 
This article attempts to demarcate local government's legislative powers over 
Schedule 4B and 5B matters by putting forward a test that gives content to section 
156(3) of the Constitution. Litigation on this topic is not necessarily flowing thick and 
fast as yet. However, as local authorities find their feet in the new dispensation and 
start asserting their constitutional status, conflicts over local government powers will 
increasingly find their way to court. The City of Cape Town's court challenge over 
national government's powers to regulate 'electricity reticulation', a Schedule 4B 
competency, is a case in point.46 Further, the legislative framework for assignment of 
powers to local government is discussed. The requirements for assignment are a novel 
way of attempting to prevent unfunded mandates to local government. However, the 
usefulness of these requirements depend on whether they are taken serious by 
provincial and national governments and on whether assignments will be undertaken 
explicitly. Local government is no longer the stepchild of national and provincial 
government. It is now a mature partner of national and provincial government. The 
Constitution replaces the direct control by and accountability to senior governments 
with accountability to the local electorate. It is only when local government is 
afforded substantial regulatory powers that the notion of development, driven at local 
level, can really take root. Local government must be allowed to govern, make 
mistakes, learn from its mistakes and, importantly, establish a sound and interactive 
relationship with its citizenry. If local government is forever treated as an infant 
                                            
46 Johnson 2002: 3. 
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sphere of government and is subjected to constant legislative interference in its 
original powers it cannot live up to the challenge of bottom-up development that is 
envisaged by the Constitution. 
